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The Fourth Biennial Meeting of the
North American Fichte Society
Michael G. Vater
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

The meeting was held at Marquette University, March 6-9, 1997. The
topic was "The Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre." The meeting opened
with a 'Fichtean Sampler,' loosely focused on the Wissenschaftslehre
Nova Methodo lectures 0796-99). Tom Rockmore offered an account of
'deduction' in Fichte's philosophy, noting that Fichte holds two
incompatible views—a Kantian one that promises logical deduction and
a weaker sense that promises only rigorous exposition of the fact of
knowledge. If our interest is philosophical, not merely historical, the
Kantian version is best forgotten since it puts Fichte in the unhappy
position of having to make good the claims of epistemological
foundationalism. A weaker but more palatable take on the
Wissenschaftslehre is as a rigorous attempt to view human knowledge
from the limited standpoint of the human subject. Angelica Nuzzo
located the defining characteristic of the Wissenschaftslehre Nova
Methodo in its abolition of the distinction, inherited from Kant,
between the practical and the theoretical. The 1794 Grundlage des
gesamten Wissenschaftslehre had already transmuted the distinction
of practical and theoretical faculties or powers into that of real and
ideal activities. The Nova Methodo lectures fashion a unified view of
the activities of the 'I' and spell out a new vision of philosophic
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system, beyond the dualism of theory and practice. Kip Jensen came
to much the same conclusion: the textbook version of Fichte's
philosophy as an overblown version of Kant's 'primacy of the practical'
is not to be found in the later Jena Wissenschaftslehre. What is found
is a unitary philosophy based on the ‘I’ reflecting itself outside the
limits of reflection. Jensen characterized the project as a drive to
comprehend the incomprehensible, to cognize the very origin of
reflexivity or consciousness. Jay Morris focused on freedom and selfactivity in the later Jena lectures, arguing that Fichte saw difficulties in
Kant's treatment of these two themes. If Kant left Critical Philosophy
without a unified account of reason, Fichte made good the lack by
identifying Spontaneität and Selbsttatigkeit. Fichte thus improves
Kant's philosophy by being faithful to its spirit, not its letter. HansJakob Wilhelm considered the overstated claim Fichte made to Jacobi
that he could deduce the individual from the absolute ‘I’. Whereas
Jacobi resorted to the philosophical novel to bridge the gap between
theoretical construct and the living individual, in Fichte's system the
individual person remains an irrational quantity that can be treated
only by pragmatic means, through a politics of education. Wayne
Martin closed this 'sampler' session by considering Fichte's relation to
philosophy of science. One ought not simply assimilate Fichte's interest
in particular sciences either to what Lauth calls Fichte's
"transcendental doctrine of nature" nor to the project of
Naturphilosophie. The 1794 essay "On the Concept of
Wissenschaftslehre" provides an approach useful for formulating a
distinctively Fichtean philosophy of science, since it treats the
particular sciences not so much as bodies of theory but as distinctive
cognitive practices organized around unifying theoretical principles.
The second and third sessions of the conference were devoted
to influences upon Fichte and his reception by other philosophers.
Daniel Breazeale offered an experimental 'fictionalist' reading of the
Wissenschaftslehre as the first of a two-part attempt to avoid the
standard interpretation that treats it as a piece of metaphysical
dogmatism. Despite the attractiveness of such an "as-if" reading, it
ignores important features of Fichte's project, e.g. its attempt to
reflect real human thinking in systematic form. Claude Piche discussed
Fichte's doctrine of feeling against the background of Jacobi's critique
of Kant. Fichte agrees with Jacobi that neither a phenomenal object
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nor an object in itself can explain the origin of affection. Like Jacobi,
he concludes that if no 'object' of any sort can provide the explanation,
it must be sought in the knowing subject. For this reason, the
Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo reinterprets sense-perception as
'feeling,' contrary to Kant's definition of the term. But in the end, the
origin of 'feelings' remains as much a mystery as Kant's thing-in-itself.
Bruce Merrill considered the Kantian origins of Fichte's thought. The
"First Introduction" to the Wissenschaftslehre appropriates Kant's Third
Antinomy (the conflict between freedom and determinism) and its
resolution in a shift from theory to practice. It also reflects the Second
Critique's 'proof' of freedom as a "fact of reason"—the site where
Fichte first attached himself to Kantian philosophy in 1790. Curtis
Bowman closed the second session by exploring the Kantian
background to the Atheism Controversy of 1799 and Jacobi's charge
that the Wissenschaftslehre was nihilistic. It was Kant's moral
theology, reflected in the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, that
moved Fichte to identify God and the moral world-order in the later
Jena period. For Jacobi, this identification was too close to the position
he had repudiated in the conflict over pantheism in the 1780's. Steve
Hoeltzel opened the third session with a consideration of the
divergences between Fichte and Schelling 1794-1797. While Fichte
characterizes the system-principle or "absolute I" as free but
intrinsically finite activity, Schelling insists that the absolute's freedom
is incompatible with any limitation. Consequently, he claims philosophy
is unable to link the finite world of human experience to its
unconditioned basis—a position quite opposed to Fichte's. Dale Snow
looked to later differences between the two thinkers as they emerged
in the earnest but often bitter Correspondence (1799-1803). Fichte
criticizes Schelling's unfortunate tendency to give a false metaphysical
status to the real, while Schelling in turn laments Fichte's inability to
escape the subjective and achieve true speculative insight. George
Seidel connected Fichte with the tradition of innate ideas that runs
through modern philosophy from Descartes to Leibniz. He argued that
in Kant and Fichte, the idea takes on practical significance, signifying
the "moral law written in the human heart" (Romans 2: 15). Vladimir
Zeman discussed Feuerbach's relationship to Fichte. What in
Feuerbach's pre-1839 idealistic period tended to be a positive
assessment becomes in his mature philosophy primarily a negative
critique. Michael Vater compared Fichte's phenomenalism with that of
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the 2nd Century Indian Buddhist, Nagarjuna. Though both thinkers
hold comparable positions on the nature of the ‘I’, the reactive
structure of perception and consciousness, and on the primitive nature
of agency, the phenomenal world that Fichte presents as the horizon
of actualized freedom is viewed by the Buddhist thinker as duhkha, the
torrent of craving and dissatisfaction from which one seeks liberation.
Lon Nease treated the "severity of the moral law" in Fichte as yet
another example of Fichte's drawing the full consequences of a Kantian
theory more consistently and more rigorously than Kant himself did.
For Fichte no acts are morally neutral.
The fourth session was devoted to Fichte's ethics. Yolanda Estes
considered the relation between pure will and intellectual intuition in
the later Jena period. The moral situation of an empirical individual
faced by a summons (Aufforderung) provides the material from which
the philosopher abstracts the concept of intellectual intuition or pure
willing that grounds the Wissenschaftslehre. This pure will has different
functions in different parts of the system. In transcendental philosophy
it serves as a scientific hypothesis for the construction of a theory of
consciousness. As a hypothetical imperative facing a determined
empirical individual, it becomes a hypothesis for theory of law
(Rechtslehre). Intuited by the moral subject, it is the categorical
imperative, the basis for moral theory (Sittenlehre). Alain Perrinjaquet
focused on a similar theme, the way conscience functions as 'real'
intellectual intuition in the Nova Methodo lectures. He illustrated the
connection of conscience to intellectual intuition qua Tathandlung, and
the relationship of both forms of intellectual intuition to the
philosopher's consciousness. Arnold Farr considered Fichte's
reformulation of Kant's categorical imperative in the later Jena
writings. Kant's view of the imperative as merely the announcement of
moral duty is inadequate since it does not provide for the unity of
theoretical and practical reason. In Fichte's view, not only does the 'I'
become conscious of its duty through the imperative, it also becomes
conscious of the conditions for acting dutifully it becomes conscious of
the limitations against which it must strive. The 'I' finds itself
simultaneously active and passive, and this points to the
equiprimordiality of the theoretical reason (the feeling of necessity)
and its practical aspect (the feeling of freedom). Ken Foldes considered
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the notion of freedom found in Fichte's Orundlage des Naturrechts and
elaborated Hegel's early critique of this concept.
A fifth session was devoted to the Wissenschaftslehre Nova
Methodo and comparisons to earlier and later works that expounded
the Wissenschaftslehre. C. Jeffrey Kinlaw explored the relation
between feeling (Gefühl) and drive or disposition (Trieb) in Fichte's
theory of knowledge. Since knowing an object requires that feeling be
brought to consciousness, and such knowing is guided by drives—e.g.
the drive to represent or, more basically, the drive to reflect—this
epistemological function sheds new light on the primacy of practical
reason in Fichte's philosophy. Perhaps that primacy may be more
radical than has usually been acknowledged. Janet Roccanova explored
the early chapters of the Nova Methodo lectures, using
phenomenological concepts such as 'the given' and 'intentionality' to
illustrate how Fichte guides his students through the performance of
the series of acts that are under discussion. Fichte believes that one
who wishes to become a philosopher must actually perform the
philosophy, especially the crucial initial acts of Wissenschaftslehre that
make the transition between ordinary and philosophical consciousness.
In these acts are developed the germs of Fichte's notions of selfpositing, intellectual intuition, the concept of the 'I,' reason, and the
opposition between concept and intuition. Gunter Zoller discussed the
status of the individual in a wide range of writings from the later Jena
Wissenschaftslehre, stressing the systematic place of individuality
between the absolute 'I' on the one hand and the inter personality of
the social and moral spheres on the other. He noted, as had Estes and
Perrinjaquet, the different status accorded to individuality in the
foundational part of the system, the transcendental history of
consciousness, and in the Foundation of Natural Law (1796-97) and
the System of Ethics (1798). Johannes Brachtendorf examined the
methodological differences between the 1794/95 Grundlage and the
Nova Methodo lectures of 1796-99. The earlier work invoked the
notion of an apparently external' check' to account for the determinacy
of the'!, encountered in representation. While this did account for
externality, it fell short of Fichte's own concept of a theory of principles
that fulfill the requirements of a homogeneous, idealist philosophy.
The second Jena Wissenschaftslehre fulfills that requirement, since its
whole account of the construction of consciousness is based on the
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idea of a free and spontaneous act of self-determination by the 'l.' rves
Radrizzani argued that the Vocation of Man does not represent a break
with earlier Jena writings, but is fully consistent with them.
The final session was devoted to the topic of intersubjectivity
and the Grundlage des Naturrechts. Speaking directly to that topic,
Klaus Brinkmann emphasized the originality of Fichte as the first to
argue that personal identity is socially constructed. But he noted also
that the community remains a community of individuals; Fichte is not
a totalitarian. Robert Williams considered the ambiguity of Fichte's
philosophy of right. Fichte introduces the concept of recognition (An
erkennung) to provide a grounding both for Kant's sense of freedom
and for Rousseau's social contract. Freedom and right as the existence
of freedom in the world are intersubjectively mediated through
recognition. But Fichte fails to fully ground his concept of right in
recognition and allows it to be displaced by coercion in his analysis of
security, changing community from a condition of freedom to an
instrument of surveillance. Hegel is aware of this tension in Fichte and
responds by consistently developing the idea of right from the concept
of recognition. Jean-Christoph Merle located Fichte's Rechtslehre in the
contemporary {late 18th Century} debates about natural law in
opposition to positive law, the criminal code. Fichte's theory of criminal
law "out-Kant's Kant." Scott Scribner noted that the idea of subtle
matter that Fichte uses in the 1813 Notebook on Animal Magnetism
(where it signifies the medium for hypnotic communication) dates back
to the 1796 Grundlage des Naturrechts. The problem of the influence
of the other, overtly captured in the concept of recognition, is
paralleled in this work by a generalized problem of 'influence,'
represented by the notion of subtle matter. Fichte moves toward
according to the unconscious an important role in social life, even at
this early date. Paul Franks argued that the new method of the later
Jena Wissenschaftslehre signifies a transformation in Fichte's thinking
that dates back to the summer of 1795, to his first inklings that the
problem of other minds and the problem of human rights might have
the same solution. In the systematically worked 232 The Owl of
Minerva 28:2 (Spring 1997) out version of the unified solution, it is the
summons (Aufforderung) that testifies to the reality of other minds
and provides the unified treatment of theory and practice. But the
reason why Fichte may have come to the thought of the unified
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solution to human rights and other minds may have been a conviction,
formed in debate with Schmid and Reinhold in 1795, that in this way
heteronomy could be acknowledged as a mode of human freedom.
Whether this was Fichte's actual path of thought or not, it is a
philosophically interesting point of intersection between
epistemological concerns about the status of other minds and concerns
about normativity in practical philosophy.
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